The driving force in federal licensing has been the combined political interests of legislatois desirous of obtaining valuable prerogatives over the assignment of frequencies; incumbent broadcasters, ever vigilant in restricting new entry into broadcasting; and "public interest" lobbyists, whose self-interests lay in politicizing the assignment process d, :pite the expropriation which their constituents thereby suffered. Nance, a classic rent-seeking competition forged the licensing regime in broadcasting in the 192Cs and has steadfastly maintained it since, due to the vector payoffs associated with such a schema. The support for this thesis is evidence suggesting that the historical rendition of the pre-regulation broadcasting market offered in both the NBC and the Red Lion cases was largely fanciful, and that a more accurate history of the early broadcasting period reveals that an orderly market was reshaped by political interests to yield rents, not to solve interference. This history shows that physica-scarcity and its ancillary justifications for content regulation are ad hoc rationalizations of policies adopted for specified political purposes. Most important for Constitutional considerations is that the means chosen to implement such dealings provoke precisely the same concerns that make government licensing of print unlawful; i.e., politicization of the press produces results antagonistic to the most fundamental First Amendment values. ((1L) 
1 The Uniqueness of Broadcasting.
Before 1927, the allocation of frequencies was left entirely to the private sector, and the result was chaos. It quickly became apparent that broadcast frequencies constituted a scarce resource whose use could be regulated and rationalized only by the Government. Without government control, the medium would be of little use because of the cacophony of competing voices, none of which could be clearly and predictably heard. Consequently, the Federal Radio Commission was established to allocate frequencies in a manner responsive to the public "convenience, interest, or necessity."'
The dichotomy between constitutional protections extended to the print press (e.g., books, magazines, and newspapers) and those aiforded the electronic press (e.g., broadcast television, radio, cable television, videotext) has received a great deal of attention in the legal, communications, and public policy literature? The truncation of first amendment protection, blanketing print publishers but only scantily covering electronic publishers, has been established by the U.S.
Supreme Court in NBC', Red Lions, and Tornillo'. Around this legal interpretation has built up an impressive regulatory structure for the Ironic press, with broadcasters licensed as "public trustees" by the Federal Communications Commission, and cable television operators franchised by local governments. In either situation, the character and performance of electronic publishers are explicitly taken into account in licensing and renewal decisions. The strictures against government discretion in print regulation are seriously compromised.
1 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 US 367 (1969) , at 380-1 (footnotes omitted).
2 5gg Friendly, The Good Guys, the Bad Guys, and the First Amendment (1975) Broadcast, So. Cal. L.R. (1985) ; Powe, American Broadcasting and the First Amendment (1987) . 3 National Broadcasting Co., Inc. et al. v. United States et al., 319 U.S. 190 (1943) . 4 Supra note 1. 5 Miami Herald Publishing Co. vs. Tornillo 418 U.S. 241 (1974) . 1 There has developed a series of justifications for this divergence. The most general line of reasoning developed by the courts, the Commission, Congress, and various communications law experts, is that broadcasting is fundamentally different than print in two ways, and that these differences allow the government to exercise regulatory discretion over content without violating the values underlying the first amendment. Indeed, such valuer mandate the exercise of such power. These differences are, firstly, that without government regulation of the broadcast band, no electronic speech would be possible; hence, the government in essence creates the entire category of broadcast speech6 via regulation, giving it special authority to influence what is communicated. Secondly, the "physical scarcity" of the electromagnetic spectrum dictates a situation in which not all who wish to broadcast may do so; hence, the government must, in its simple custodial role, employ some discretion in selecting recipients of the "right" to broadcast.
Indeed, the choicemaking process colors such a right so fundamentally at io turn a broadcasting license into a special privilege denied (necessarily, given scarcity) to others. The government may well, under the congressional mandates given ir, the 1927 Radio Act and the 1934
Communications Act, exercise such inherent discretion in the public interest, and assign (as well as administer) these subject privileges to private parties subject to broad regulatory jurisdiction not directly related to the interference problem.
Under this view there has built up a host of secondary justifications for the "public trusteeship" model. The most important spring from the idea that, as new technology has taken us beyond the traditional forms of communication known to the Founding Fathers, the harshly libertarian first amendment stricture, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging freedom of speech, or of the press...", must be replaced by affirmative governmental obligations promoting the underlying values of free speech and press. Due to changing economic and technical cond'tions, a laissez faire approach to the press market will no longer accomplish what the first 6 We consider only broadcasting in the discussion to follow. coordinates be legally defined and enforced by government. This judicial function, moreover, turns out to be nothing more or less than the property rights "traffic cop" function of government necessary to deter anarchistic chaos in any private market. In arguing that federal licensing of broadcasters was necessary to eliminate the interference problem potential to any common resource (which many economic resources lacking legally defined rights will quickly turn into12), the Court mistakenly compacted two distinct functions --rights definition and fights assignment --into one.
The economics of this revisionist analysis are flawless. The resulting persuasiveness has attracted many efforts to fix this "mistake" in first amendment law by showing that a private assignment mechanism is indeed workable for electromagnetic spectrum, and outlining the details of such a tnarket.13 The principle feature of such approaches is that the federal government will define property rights in spectrum, and will collect payments (as in an auction) for its use. No regulation of content is required to technically solve the commons problem in 12 Wherever private enforcement costs are high, in fact. In some situations, alternatively, the private market may well handle the property rights enforcement problem as well or better than government police powers. It appears that spectrum rights, like many other goods (copyrights, trade names, water rights, etc.) are expensive to enforce without state-supplied legal institutions. in restricting new entry into broadcasting, and "public interest" lobbyists, whose self-interests lay in politicizing the assignment process despite the expropriation which their constituencies thereby suffered. Hence, a classic rent-seeking competition forged the licensing regime in broadcasting in the 1920s, and has steadfastly maintained it since, due to the vector of payoffs associated with such a scheme. While the general "public interest" in a free press has not been thereby well-served, the structure has efficiently distributed gains to precisely those players most influential in erecting and maintaining it. This accounts for the system's longevity and vigor in the face of strongly compelling public interest 'guments striking at the heart of the regime.
The support for this thesis is evidence sugesting that the historical rendition of Or;
pre-regulation broadcasting market offered in both NBC and Red Lion was largely fanciful, and that a more accurate history of the early broadcasting period reveals that an orderly market was reshaped by political interests to yield rents, not to solve interference. This history shows that physical scarcity and its ancillary justifications for content regulation are ad hoc rationalizations of policies adopted for specific political purposes. Most important for Constitutional considerations is that the means chosen to implement such dealings provoke precisely the same concerns which make government licensing of print unlawful: politicization of the press produces results antagonistic to the most fundrmental first amendment values.
2 The Genesis of Regulation.
In my forthcoming me/46, I show at some length that the evidence is compelling that major broadcasters, leaders in both the executive and legislative branches of the federal government, and (to a much lesser extent) "public interest" advocates combined politically to produce the Radio Act of 1927. The motive force behind the law was not the interference over 550 broadcasters (see Table 1 ), all confined to, basically, one frequency by the federal authorities. Separation by time and place, involving a difficult coordination of a new media, kept transmissions from interfering one with another. Such divisions were arranged in the licensing function of the Commerce Department, often subject to agreements worked out voluntarily (sometimes entailing the exchange of money) between broadcasters.
The right to broadcast was obviously key to the entire market. Should there be confusion as to the ownership of a frequency at a particular time and place, then it would be difficult for The historical account given by the Court in NBC and repeated in Red Lion (as quoted above) is cast into serious doubt by the simple evidence in Table 1 , showing radio set sales monotonically increasing, year-by-year, until 1926. Under the Court's pre -1927 "chaos" version, the predicted radio set sales profile would exhibit a significant kink upon establishment of an orderly market, i.e. 1927 (the Radio Act was signed into law 23 Febary, 1927) . Indstead, radio sales rose steadily throughout the early radio years, with a downturn in 1926. This is explained straightforwardly by the quick creation of de facto property rights (by the Department of Commerce on a "priority-in-use" basis), and the interruption of that system in July 1926 to February 1927 time frame commonly referred to as "the period of the breakdown of the law."
In a "wave-jumping" case invited by the Secretary of Commerce, who had been requesting a congressional mandate for a discretionary standard in his rights assignments function since 1921, a federal district court ruleZ that the Secretary had no legal right10 deny a broadcasting license (as had been held by a court in 192310, nor the ability to set place or hours of operation.
In that the limiting of new licensees to just those time, frequency and power assignments selected by the Commerce Department effectively gave the Department the power to enforce exclusive rights to spectrum (simply by not issuing any new licenses to time, place, and frequency placements currently in use, without the consent of the current user), the decision forced abandonment of a property rights system which had efficaciously solved the potential "commons" problem in radio. Chaos ensued from the ruling, as predictable not only in hindsight'', but as promised by Hoover and a host of contemporary commentators.20
There was little then mysterious about the ability of private property rights to functionally create a smoothly operating radio broadcasting market. Nor about the problem entailed with ill-definition of rights. Rather than "confusing" federal licensing under a public trustreship standard with the necessary and sufficient enforcement of exclusive rights to spectrum, there was widespread unaftrstanaing of exactly the cause and effect of either order or chaos at the time of the 1927 Act. This would be lost in post hoc explanations of the licensing regime, most importantly given in NBC and Red Lion. Note the vast difference in historical accounting detailed in the first annual report of the Federal Radio Commission, born in the 1927 Act, with the key passage from Red Lion above:
We have had about six years of radio broadcasting. It was in 1921 that the first station (KDKA) started operating. and soon grew in popularity, sales mounted, and a great new Indus* was in the making. Then something happened.
In July, 1926, just 10 months ago, the Attorney General of the United States rendered his famous opinion that the Secretai of Commerce, under the radio law of 1912, was without power to control the broadcasting situation or to assign wave lengths. Thus, after five years of orderly development, control was off. Beginning i 'th August, 1926, anarchy reigned in the ether.
As the result many stations jumped without restraint to new wave lengths which suited them better, regardless of the interference which they might thus be causing to other stations. The solution created by the Commission was to order established broadcasters to "return" to previously held assignments (i.e., pre-breakdown), and to expropriate new entrants.n Expanding the number of broadcast frequencies so as accomodate all then existing broadcasters was emphatically rejected. This could have been done "extensively," by enlarging the commercial broadcasting band from 1500 kc to 2000 kc, or "intensively," by reducing channel separations from 10 kc to 7 kc. Radio broadcast interests bitterly opposed this, and the idea of eliminating interference via supply expansion was dropped with finality.' The result was a classic regulatory capture, featuring significant industry rents created via public policy, which were shared with political constituencies in proportion to their effective influence over policy?'
It is central to understand that the effective policy regime launched by the Radio Act of 1927, however, did not change the radio market according to the "public interest," so much as it simply reasserted property rights under federal law, claims which ha,: Numerous analysts who believe that the Red Lion physical scarcity logic is uncompelling are apt to explain the Court's deferential attitude to regulatory authority as springing from a view that the electronic media are just not like the hard-news media of print journaliants This contention is untestable, in that it concerns the psychic motivations of jurists, but a further supposition is. This is the historical observation that radio was not, at first, considered to be part of the press, and that regulatory institutions sprang up which treated broadcasdni simply like a business (or even a public utility). The legal importance of the argument is dtat it interprets the resulting licensing structure, even if wrongheaded, as a benign happenstance dictated by the need to create a property rights system to solve the interference problem.
As seen above, the interference problem was seen in sophisticated terms, and few illusions prevailed as to the need for a federal licensing standard as a solution to that problem. The political demand to regulate radio precisely because it was instantly identified as a powerful medium of expression, however, is very strongly suggested by the facts. This adds a very different gloss to the modern interpretation which fixes and ignorance as to future market events analytical mistake as the major components behind the demand to license the electronic press. a. The immediate rise of radio censorship.
That radio broadcasting was seen to be influential as a transmitter of ideas and information of great social impact can be directly inferred by the instant concern over the political 26 Sr& Pool, supra note XX, at ; Powe, supra note XX, at ramifications of specific radio programs. This concern was expressed on both sides of the market: political actors were quick to intimidate, and radio producers were quick to self-regulate, in the fear that the consequence of offensiveness would be costly political trouble. 32 An early congressional measure to outlaw the advocacy of the theory of evolution was voted down. ar&Barnouw, supra note XX, at 197.
by the political explosiveness of controversial programming to stick to safer fare, such as music.
33
American Telephone & Telegraph specifically eschewed programming its own broadcast stations, preferring instead to operate on a common carrier basis, so as to forgo the inevitable political problems with political authorities. As a regulated utility, executives believed that the corporate exposure to penalties in the form of denied rate increases, e .7., was significant, and sought to remove themselves from any such liability that "editorial troubles" might create.M Th.: creation of the first radio network, the National Broadcasting Company, is noteworthy in two respects. First is its timing. It was formed during the period of alleged chaos, an odd moment in which to produce expensive network programming. Indeed, it debuted in September, 1926 --precisely at the moment where even a more sophisticated historical analysis would reveal to be during "the period of the breakdown of the law." The key, however, is that the more powerful stations with which NBC was affiliated had firmly established rights even in the "anarchy" of July, 1926 to February, 1927 . Hence, the initial programming was such a large success that a second NBC network (to form both Red and Blue networks) began broadcasting in January, 1927 --also before any federal radio law to end the "cacaphony of competiag voices."
The second interesting facet of NBC's tactical market entry was the very politick manner in which they conducted themselves. While newspapers of the era were openly partisan in their expressed viewpoints, organizer David Sarnoff very purposefully composed a voluntary advisory board tying together prominent citizens across a wide spectrum of opinion. While this difference could, in the traditional presentation, be inferred as evidence that contemporary actors, including Sarnoff, simply did nrit consider the radio to be imbued with the functions of the press, quite the opposite conclusion appears warranted. Sarnoff explicitly declared that the medium should be viewed legally as were newspapers: "the same principles that apply to freedom of the press 33 Ibid., at 141.
34 Barnouw, supra note XX, at 186. The control of the Department of Commerce during the early days of radio was obvious, although the limitations on Department discretion were apparent as well. The locus of legal authority clearly resided within the Department's aegis, and the annual Radio Conferences allowed industry officials to set technical and policy rulings in an orderly fashion. The ability of the Department to use its rights-enforcement apparatus in a more discretionary ntanner, however, favoring certain types of programming, for instance, was truncated by the lack of statuatory authority for any such action, arid the industry preference for relatively discretion -fine enforcement of priority-in-use property rights.
But the power of radln was obvious to Secretary Hoover, who (it is now safe to say) had his eyes set on higher political office, and who saw clearly that even the slightest ability to influence the performance of radio broadcasters would be a capital political asset. Indeed, the frequent cynical references during the middle 1920s in the trade and popular press to Hoover's interest in radio being motivated by his desire to be president of the United States is now highly suggestive. What is apparent, however, is that Hoover sought to establish political control in the Department of Commerce early on in the Harding Administration (wrestling it away from the 35 In Pool, supra note XX, at 120. See also, Sarnoff, The Freedom of the Air, 119 The Nation (23 July, 1924), 90.
36 In January 1923, the firm specifically searched for an individual whose mainstream politics (and "Americanism") were unassailable, settling on General Harbord, a super-patriot who was formerly Gen. Pershing's chief of staff. Barnouw, supra note XX, at 124.
2 Navy Department and other governmental interests after a rough political skirmish), and immediately embarked on a legislative campaign (via his ally, Congressman White of Maine) to procure a mandate t-I regulate radio as according to "public interest."
There was little about rad.::: that Herbert Hoover, an accomplished engineer and political operative, did not understand. It was his consistent goal, well before the "breakdown of the law," to achieve discretionary control over the content of ..ynat was broadcast precisely due to the fact that radio was such a powerful medium of expression. Whatever was said of radio later, Hoover always considered it a great organ of the press. As his Memoirs summed up his thoughts (as given in his speeches and articles of the time): "I was impressed with three things [concerning radio]: first, the immense importance of the spoken radio; secondly, the urgency of placing the new channels of communication under public control; and third, the difficulty of devising such control in a new art."" More explicit still was Hoover's belief that the chaos of the airwaves was a welcome motivation for achieving the discretion over radio licenses which had not been forthcoming, largely because the radio market was working so smoothly (prior to the breakdown) .n Yet, Hoover, while making precisely the same paeans to free speech that were customary then and now, was quite straightforward about the driving force for such control --not to define rights to broadcast frequencies, but to influence what was said and who was to be allowed to say it:
It seems to me we have in this development of governmental relations two distinct problems. First, is a question of traffic control. This must be a Federal responsibility.... This is an administrative job, and for good administration must lie in a single responsibility.
37 Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the Presidency,1920 Presidency, -1933 Presidency, (1952 , at 139. See also, Hoover, The Urgent Need for Radio Legislation, Radio Broadcast ( 1923) , at 211. judgment is beyond the scope of this paper, there is an uncompelling nature to the currently fashioned response: If broadcasting ever were physically scarce, it is no longer so today, due to the discovery and employment of vast new sources of spectrum." If the physical scarcity doctrine was meaningless at its creation, then it cannot be overturned by new empirical evidence on market supplies.
It is difficult to regard the physical scarcity doctrine as meaning anything at all. There is the economic argument of Coase's, well-taken, that scarcity pervades all economic goods, and that, e.g., while Renoir paintings may be physically scarce (there is a finite, and easily determined, number of them in existence), the market auctions them off to their highest valued 41 Rosen, supra note XX, at 10, 50, 84, 95-6. 42 Coast, supra note XX, at 43 As argued in Pool, supra note XX at , and Powe, supra note XX, at .
44 Fowler & Brenner, supra note XX, at employments rather easily. Yet, the physical scarcity of airwaves cannot be similarly i sought of, because frequencies are divisable (or expandable) in ways that works of art are presumably not.
Bruce Owen has noted that the spectrum can be mined more intensively, using less separation between frequencies with more (and/or higher quality) broadcast transmitters and/or better receivers, or more extensively, deploying more sophisticated sending and receiving equipment so as to exploit progressively higher or lower wave lengths." The idea of a fixed number of frequencies to be awarded to a fixed number of speakers simply begs the question of unit definition, as well as the question regarding how much of the spectrum is to be used for radio broadcasting. As only a small fraction of the band has ever been devoted to this purpose", the extensive margin has never been close to the binding constraint of economics and technology.o Deci3ionmakers in the early days of radio could not have been unaware of such considerations; indeed, we have already noted that the first substantive FRC ruling was to reject two suggestions to increase the number of available frequencies, one by increasing the radio band, the other by reducing kilocycles per assigned frequency. Yet, despite the temptation to ascribe later court decisions to mere irrationality, perhaps another way of addressing physical scarcity should be advanced. Suppose Line just cannot grasp the notion that intensive and extensive margins exist for further exploitation over all ranges in radio, that the spectrum is no 47 Curiously, the Red Lion opinion expressed awareness of the inherently arbitrary definition of physical -carcity in allowing as how the number of frequency permits was indeterminate with respect to time coordinates (and, hence, infinite): "Rather than confer frequency monopolies on a relatively small number of licensees, in a Nation of 200,000,000, the Government could surely have decreed that each frequency should be shared among all or some of those who wish to use it, each being assigned a portion of the broadcast week." 395 US 390-1. The same, obviously, is equally true with respect to geographical and frequency divisions. more finite than zinc, timber, or oil, and that the appropriate size of the band will always depend on the cost/benefit trade-off faced on such margins. In other words, one cannot see the spectrum an econf c good. Physical scarcity is still inexplicable.
The easiest way to deduce this is to consider cable delivery. We are today familiar with cable television transmission of video signals over coaxial copper wires. Such cables are just "spectrum in a tube," as they have been dubbed by engineers. Whatever physical scarcity is thought to exist in the airwaves cannot even lead to a general physical scarcity problem due to the possibility of delivering precisely the same signals (non-interfering) over a wire between any two points. This is not, further, a miracle so.'ution provided by high technology: U.S. consumers were receiving radio service via cable as early as 19234, and AT&T first considered transmitting radio signals in 1919 not via airwaves, but by wirn.0
The truly interesting legal point is that the federal cuurts have indeed rejected the physical scarcity doctrine; for cable television transmission. Cables are Lot finite like the airwaves, goes the logic. Yet, they deliver precisely the same product, and function as substitutes. Since "physical scarcity" denies the economic (i.e., cost-based) approach to scarcity as relevant, the fact that one means is chearwr than another is unimportant. The ability to replicate 3 "physically scarce" technology with a "non-physically scarce" technology makes the former concept an empty box.
5 "The Rights of the Listener" and "Diversity"
The origins of radio regulation provide interesting vintages for the development of two doctrines used to back-up the physical scarcity analysis, (a) the supremacy of the rights of the listeners, and (b) a diversity of voices. The premise that physical scarcity makes broadcasting 48 Barnouw, supra note XX, at 154. 49 Ibid., at 106.
unique is buttressed with the idea that government licensing of broadcasters helps to further the public purposes behind the first amendment. Hence, discretion over content does not, on net, diminish freedom of the press. In Red Lion the Court was blunt in rejecting the claims of the broadcaster who argued that the Constitution was designed to protect his right to speak, publish, or --eventually --broadcast:
"It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." The industry angle in using such arguments was that the "public interest" and the "rights of the listeners" would be best served by establishing a federal regulatory regime which gave effective property rights to the biggest and most established broadcasters.52 Hoover, while loyal in large measure to such interests, desired to become more personally involved in the award and adjudication of such rights in his role as a public servant. Most interesting politically, however, is that precisely the same philosophical views as to the optimal regulatory regime were advanced by spokespersons for "the public interest," non-profit broadcasters such as universities, churches, municipalities, labor unions, and the American Civil Liberties Union. All records of broadcasting stations should be kept on forms prescribed by the Department (of Commerce] and opened periodically to the public. Such records should include programs which have been broadcst, itemized in accordance with types of broadcasting such as jazz, opera, speeches, etc... The public and the Department, in possession of such facts, may more wisely come to a determination as to whether or not the particular station should have its license renewed or revoked on the sole basis of public benefits"
"Diversity" very q sxkly became the regulatory rationale developed by such proponents of government control, who sought to achieve added influence over content via public trusteeship.
They would stand to gain by a policy that allowed their "public interest" currency to help purchase broadcast rights in the rights "auction." That such a mandate instantly turns into rigorous government control and content censorship can be seen in the ambitious policy statement by Ernst above; that it is simply a vacuous standard depending solely upon the 53 Ernst, Radio Censorship and the "Listening Millions," 12.2 The Nation (28 April, 1924), 443-4. . d_.,attion of the political coalition exercising effective authority can be inferred from the expropriation of the very constituency which advanced the standard itself during the 1920s debate over radio legislation.
That the affirmative obligation to provide "diversity" over the airwavesm does great violence to the negative protection from authority in the first amendment can be seen in comparing U.S. law to Soviet law. The constitution of the U.S.S.R. contains many rights and freedoms, but all a el be delivered under the discretion of regulatory officials. When the state iF put in the position of supplying particular outputs, such as a diversity of opinion sources, then constitional protections become both superfluous and ineffectual because only by applying subjecttive judgments may administrative agencies determine how to produce such outputs.'
Similarly, the "rights of the listeners" argument has been such a steady stand-by as a justification for governmental authority, even by opposing political interests, because it effectively transfers decisionmaldng over outputs into the political/bureaucratic process. "Listeners or viewers" are served in the economic marketplace by private sellers, and in the political marketplace by government (and other) representatives. To argue for the "rights of listeners" is to beg the question; what is significant is how such rights are to be exercised, via voluntary patronage (private market) or federal representation (government icg9lation). Hence, as applied, the argument confuses listeners' rights, proper, with government regulatory rights. This insight, while perhaps subtle to outside analysts, has apparently been straightfor ward to petitioners for government discretion (always properly vested) since Hoover's initial arguments on the subject in the early 1920s.
54 Red lion, 395 US 390. 55 Indeed, the FCC supression of cable in the 1960s and 1970s as "reasonably ancillary" to the broadcast regulation mission shows how far towards a controlled outcome such affirmative provision of first amendment "values" can take an agency.
Conclusion
The demand to regulate broadcasting in the United States has not been driven by the desire to control interferenle, which when combined with the error theory of federal licensing, produces the standard legal/economic analysis in sophisticated contemporary discussion. The motive to control broadcasting through federal licensing and public trusteeship has been, since its earliest days, driven by the political advantages to be had in influencing a key communications medium of increasing social importance. Certainly pm of this demand can be ascribed to pure economic rent-seeking; controlling valuable franchises is lucrative. But influencing the direction of rent assignments and influencing the political slant of reporting are complementary outputs of the regulatory regime as constructed. Ideological rent seeking would almost certainly accompany financial rent seeking, as payments (or extractions) to the political licensing authority can be m !de in either dimension simultaneously. Only a special case "corner solution" would imply that just one form of exchange between licensees and licensors be employed.
This brings us to the very heart of the first amendment question in electronic communications. The contention of this paper, in fact, is that the actual historical creation of broadcasting regulation renders the standard pro-first amendment arguments of secondary consequence. It is IlJt simply that we now possess the know how to set private property rights into free play in the broadcasting market, nor that we have discovered vast new supplies of electromagnetic spectrum to make the old physical scarcity arguments fade on even their own terms. What we are led to conclude is that the demand to regulate electronic communications has occurred largely for the very reasons which we have crafted a Constitution to protect us against: Government manipulation of an industry of supreme importance to democratic life.
The basic thrust behind the first amendment's right to a free press, the underlying first amendment value, is not that private markets function perfectly in regards to market structure, choice of topics, or "fairness." Indeed, freedom of contract is widely known to yield highly .1 variable results. The premise of the Constitution, however, is that competition between firms and individuaL; for subscribers is a better process than is ruling the market via government fiat.
Not only is the latter entirely monopolistic, it is coercive. The measured cost/benefit analysis implicit in the first amendment is that the riskiness of the latter is less preferred outweighs the quality variance entailed in the former.
To deviate from this analysis should require a large burden of proof. Instead, NBC and
Red Lion present historical accountings and lines of arguments which are seriously underwhelming. Perhaps the evidence most poignantly demonstrative here call be gleaned by one very important point in the latter decision. In dealing with the broadcaster's contention that government enforcement of the fairness doctrine would tend to chill free speech, and deter the coverage of controversial issues to begin with, the Court responded that such a possibility was indeed "a serious matter, for should licensees actually eliminate their coverage of controversial issues, the purposes of the doctrine would be stifled."56
Yet the concern was put to rest by noting the Federal Communications Commission could then force broadcasters to cover more controversy; the public interest could, in effect, simply be conjured by diligent, intelligent, watchful regulators. Moreover, the Court found the evidence as to the exist. -tnce of a "chilling effect" lacking. Haldeman detailing the very pointed meetings he had held with the "three network chief executives."n Among the highlights are the following observations:
The networks are terribly nervous over the uncertain state of the law.... They are apprehensive about us. Although they tried to disguise this, it was obvious. The harder I pressed them (CBS and NBC) the more accomodating, cordial and almost apologetic they became. Stanton for all his bluster is the most insecure of all.
To my surprise CBS did not deny that the news had been slanted against us. Paley merely said that every Administration has felt the same way and that we have been slower in coming to them to complain than our predecessors. He, however, ordered Stanton in my presence to review the analysis with me and if the news has not been balanced to see that the situation is immediately corrected. (Paley is in complete control of CBS --Stanton is almost obsequiuous in Paley' s presence.) *** I had to break every meeting. The networks badly want to have these kinds of discussions which they said they had had with other Administrations but never with ours. They told me any time we had a complaint about slanted coverage for me to call them directly. Paley said he would like to come down to Washington and spend time with me anytime that r wanted. In short, they are very much afraid of us and trying hard to prove they are "good guys." *** adds up to the fact that they are damned nervous and scared and we should continue to take a very tough line, face to face, and in other ways.
I will review with Stanton and Goodman the substantiation of my assertion to them that their news coverage has been slanted. We will go over it point by point. This will, perhaps, make them even more cautious.")
It may have taken us sixty years to remember why licensing the press was a bad idea.
Perhaps it is appropriate to redisover why the first amendment was such a good one.e0 59 Ibid., at 244-7.
60 Pool's convergence thesis makes this rediscovery more compelling. Whatever compromises have been made to date will only escala-e in future decades, as the sphere of the electronic media expands, and that of print contracts. 
